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ABSTRACT
CHRISTINE DAY:

The French Non: The Socialist Party, Relocations, and Economic Concerns

A study that covers the factors which contributed to the French Rejection of the Treaty on the

Constitution of the European Union. Using results from polling, the study looks at why the
French named relocations, unemployment, and liberal policies as justification for the No vote.
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Introduction
On 29 May 2005, French voters rejected the Treaty on the European Union

Constitution, interrupting a long history of collaboration between France and European
Union framers that had guided European integration since its inception. Public opinion

has fluctuated in the past in France on the European Union, going through periods of
“eurosclerosis,” especially in times of European-wide economic slowdowns. Despite

these periods of fluctuation, France has always managed to support EU integration until

now. The last phase of successful EU integration by referendum was the vote on the
Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on the European Union) in 1992. European Union framers
were hopeful that the new Treaty on the European Constitution of 2005 would continue

this tradition to accommodate recent changes in its make up, specifically the addition of
10 new members that were former Soviet satellite states. The recent rejection of the

Constitution was a major disappointment to many EU supporters.
The No vote is especially significant because of France’s history of being a leader
in initiating and shaping European policy. This is relevant when one considers that the

EU has no model to replicate in order to guarantee success. Therefore, the shaping of EU
policy is extremely important. As Michel Gueldry, a professor of French Studies at the
Monterey Institute of International Studies remarks, “To put it simply, France matters for
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Europe.”1 One needs only look at the beginning of the European integration process to

see that the histories of France and Europe are deeply intertwined. France helped found
the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 to prevent a third world war and create

a successful trade area. It was European Commission President Jacques Delors (19851995) who managed to form and eventually implement the Single Market and develop

the basis for European Social Policy.
In 1992 France voted in a national referendum to accept the Maastricht Treaty
guaranteeing future European Integration of which the completion of the Single Market

was a main focus. Also included in this phase of EU integration was Monetary Union

through which a single currency was created for 12 members of the EU. These countries,
including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,

Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, are collectively called the Euro zone.
The 1990s saw the beginning of accession negotiations for what eventually became the
10 new members of the European Union. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,

Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia all became member states in
2004, making the EU the world’s largest trading bloc with a population of around 450

million. The accession of 10 new countries was one of the key motivations that led EU

framers to create a new treaty. They considered a new Constitution necessary to simplify

the decision making process in the enlarged Union. The European Convention of

December 2001 was established to draft the new text; it was chaired by former

conservative and pro-European French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing. D’Estaing
had been responsible in the 1970s for initiating the EMS (European Monetary System),

1 Michel R. Gueldry. France and European Integration Toward a Transnational Polity. (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 2001) 5.
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which was a forerunner of the EMU (European Monetary Union). European leaders
signed the Treaty of Nice, which came into effect in 2003, with the idea that it would be
replaced with a Constitution; it was this Constitution that the French recently rejected in

the referendum of 29 May 2005.
The new Constitution included a variety of reforms to the EU decision-making
process as well as to the basic structure of the EU. Although the Constitution seems
almost incomprehensible due to the complexity of the text, it is possible to recognize a

number of basic changes to the EU structure. The new Constitution emphasized the
policy of subsidiarity mainly to guarantee that EU power comes from the member states.
Subsidiarity is generally the idea that areas or issues that can be dealt with at the national
level should not be handled at the EU level. The Constitution also changed the old pillar
system of decision making, so that policy formation would have been mostly under EU

jurisdiction. The EU Parliament would have had the final decision over the budget and it

would have acquired co-legislation powers with the EU council; this would have
represented a significant step up from what the Parliament is currently able to do. Also,
the EU would have had more control over immigration policy, and qualified majority
voting would have been applied to more issues instead of requiring unanimity. Lastly, a
Charter of Fundamental Rights highlighting the basic rights of European citizens such as

life, liberty and the right to strike was included in the Constitution. However, this paper is
not an analysis of the different structures that would have changed had the Referendum

passed. Instead, it focuses on the reasons that explain why the Treaty on the European
Constitution failed to pass in France and that led the French to vote against it. It

specifically covers French fears that the EU is becoming a trading area that is too liberal

Day 4
(i.e. too market oriented). Fears of company relocations and unfair trade with lower wage
countries also exacerbated fears of unemployment in France.
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Methodology
The concept for this paper originally started with a single question: “Why did the

French reject the Treaty on the EU Constitution?” Given the public debate in the past two

years, and given the discussions on the possibility of Turkey entering the Union, I
thought I was going to find that the answer would be guided by these discussions. I
expected to find that the answer would be a combination of several factors such as French
fears of allowing a Muslim country into the Union and general discontent over the
employment level. Immigration was a key topic during the 2002 Presidential elections in

France where the extreme right almost won on an anti-immigration platform. Added to

the anti-immigration stance is the general fear that France already has a Muslim
population that is too large. The thought of Turkey entering the Union in the future could
have led many to vote against the Constitution and further European integration. I

thought initially that enlargement might be a factor, but since it had already taken place

and because accession processes had already been taking place since the 1990s, I did not

expect it to be one of the major issues. To better understand the specific reasons given by
the French as motivations for the No vote, I turned to polling data.

The first source I consulted to discover the motivations of the No vote were two
polls conducted shortly after the referendum. One poll was provided by Eurobarometer,
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the polling organization of the European Union, and the second came from IPSOS, a

leading French survey organization. Both polls provided the same type of data, but
offered respondents different choices in the motivations category. I was able to make

some interesting conclusions from the categories that voters chose as motivations for
voting against the Treaty. Voters chose company relocation/unemployment as a

motivation when it was offered more often than the other motivations.2 In the IPSOS
poll, where relocation/unemployment was not offered, more people chose discontentment
with the economic/social situation in general.
I then compared the motivations and results of the 2005 Referendum vote to the

results of the 1992 Referendum. I looked at the voting results for the 1992 Referendum in
order to see if the same reasons for voting against Maastricht in 1992 were given again in
2005. This would have allowed me to conclude that the same concerns about the

European Union in 1992 had not changed in 2005. However, I concluded that the

reasons for rejecting Maastricht in 1992 were completely different from the 2005 reasons,
and also that the added No votes primarily came from voters who were close to the Left

politically. Since the 1992 Referendum had passed but the 2005 Treaty vote had not,
there were obviously a number of people who had changed their minds since 1992. I

compared polling results from the 1992 and 2005 votes to study the source of the “extra”
No votes of the 2005 vote. I concluded that voters close to the left made up the majority

of No voters overall in the 2005 Treaty vote. Of all the groups of left-affiliated No voters,

2 Relocation is my translation of the French ‘délocalisation.’ It refers to the closure of a unit of production
in France, followed by a reopening abroad in order to re-import goods to the national territory for a lesser
cost and to continue to participate in the export market with this new unit of production.
Source : Lionel Fontagne and Jean-Herve Lorenzi, “Désindustrialisation, Délocalisations,” Les Rapports du
Conseil d'analyse économiques 55 (2005) 12 ; [on-line] available from :
http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/054000102/0000.pdf
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the Socialist Party (PS) was the largest group (see Table 1). According to the polls, of the

majority of No votes of the Left- affiliated voters, the highest percentage of people cited
relocation/unemployment as a reason to reject the Constitution;“unemployment/economic

situation” had the second highest percentage (or in the IPSOS poll the first). I then
concluded that the Left constituted the majority of No voters, and PS affiliated voters

were the largest group within the Left. I looked at the polling results for the voters
affiliated with the right, but their contribution to the No vote was not as significant as the
Left. This led me to focus on why the Left affiliated voters had changed their opinions
since Maastricht, and why such a large group of voters (the left) had voted against the

Constitution. Nonetheless, it is possible to conclude from polling results that many other
non-left-affiliated No voters were against the Constitution for the same reasons as the

Left No voters: unemployment, fear of company relocation, or fear that the EU was too

liberal. Therefore, these reasons, although cited more frequently by left-affiliated voters,
are somewhat universal. In the IPSOS poll, the majority of No voters were generally
unhappy with the economic and social situation in France.
I also reviewed the Socialist Party arguments against the Constitution because the

Left-affiliated voters made up the majority of No voters and the Socialist Party (PS) is the
largest group within the Left that voted against the Constitution. I focus on the PS
arguments because Left affiliated voters who were against the Constitution cited the same

reasons as the PS No campaign leaders who were against the Constitution. Also, reasons

cited by Left-affiliated no voters were frequently cited among non-left affiliated voters

making these motivations representative of a majority of no voters.
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Table 1: Electoral Composition of the No according to Party
PS

29.8%

left

Greens

8.5%

left

PC

10.6%

left

EG

5.6%

left

Total Left

54.5%

Total Right

36.5%

No Party affiliation

9.0%

Total =100%

The Left affiliated voters are the largest group of No voters; within the Left, the PS is the
largest group.

Source: Referendum: le Non des Classes Actives, des Classes Populaires et Moyennes,
et du_Peuple de Gauche. Canal Ipsos. 2 Jun 2005.[online organization]; available from:
http://www.ipsos.fr/canalipsos/articles/1545.asp?rubld=17
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Unemployment was often cited in relation to French discontentment with the

economic and social situations in the polls. Therefore, I then studied the unemployment
situation in France in order to observe what it was about unemployment that related to the

Constitution vote. I concluded that unemployment was a large part of the everyday life
of the French; even those who are not unemployed fear it or are aware of the high

unemployment rate. This led me to conclude that fear of company relocation, unfair

liberal trade or liberal policies motivated the no vote because many fear it will increase
unemployment. As economist Joseph E. Stiglitz explained in his book Globalization and
its Discontents, privatizations and liberalization are often met with opposition and are

related to unemployment fears. Privatization is pursued because policy makers believe

that private companies are more efficient than public enterprises. However, as Stiglitz
notes, if privatization is pursued too rapidly it can lead to failure of new enterprises in the
private sector and it can be the source of payroll cuts as a way to eliminate state losses.

Supporters of privatization argue it is a way to rid companies of inefficient workers, but

opponents feel that it allows job layoffs to occur with no concern for social costs. Stiglitz
recommends a policy of privatization accompanied by a program that would mitigate the

inevitable job loss.3 Liberalization, the removal of government direction in financial and
capital markets as well as the lowering of trade barriers, is also opposed by many who

voted against the Constitution in France. Policy makers believe that it will enable the use
of comparative advantage, but this is not always the outcome. Job loss is often the result
of liberalization because not enough capital or entrepreneurship is present to ensure the

3 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company
Inc,2002)56-57.
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success of new enterprises and jobs, especially when the lowering of trade barriers takes
place.4 Thus, job loss is often the result of hasty privatization and liberalization.

Those who chose unemployment/relocation or a weak French economic/social
situation agreed with the argument that the EU is too liberal or that relocation is negative
for the French economy overall because it represents a loss of jobs. I looked at how the

EU has changed since the Maastricht vote, because the motivations for the 2005 No vote
are different from the previous referendum. Because the reasons were different, I did not

focus on past arguments against the EU such as fear of the loss of national authority or

anti-federal viewpoints. While these remain important discussions, they are not
particularly relevant for the 2005 Treaty vote. One of the major changes since the

Maastricht vote was the enlargement of the EU; countries in Central and Eastern Europe
were added to the Union. I conclude that the recent enlargement combined with perceived

free market policies of the EU heightened these fears. Relocation is one of the
consequences of liberal trade policies and it received much attention in public debate. I

thought it relevant to survey several news publications to gauge the level of public debate
on relocation to discover whether or not public debate matched the reasons given for
voting against the Constitution. It is plausible that public debate heightened fears or

awareness of relocations. I then looked at recent studies on French company relocations
to see how widespread company relocation actually is in France. I reasoned that if it

turned out to be widespread, it could have led more French to choose relocation,
unemployment or liberal policies as a motivation to reject the Constitution.
Currently, many member states have not ratified the Constitution. The

Netherlands held a referendum on the Constitution on 1 June 2005. The Dutch are
4

Ibid, 59.
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thought to have rejected the Constitution for reasons such as fear of not enough social

Europe and immigration fears. The French share the social Europe argument with the
Netherlands, and the extreme right in France often argued against immigration during the

campaign. I do not completely disqualify other possible reasons for rejecting the

Constitution such as a fear of Turkey becoming a member. However, according to most

polls, French fears of company relocation, liberal trade and negative effects on
employment in France were the most frequently cited motivations for voting No. These
reasons are the focus of this paper. While they do not cover the entire list of motivations

for voting against the Constitution, they nonetheless cover the most frequently cited
reasons for a majority of No voters. They help explain one aspect of why the French

rejected the EU Constitution.
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1. The "Non": Who and Why

Current public debate on the European Union Constitution centers on questions of
why the French responded with a resounding “non” to the Referendum held on 29 May
2005. Speculation on the reasons includes the old federalist and nationalist debate—a

debate which many considered the cause of the close vote on the referendum of 1992.
Also, recent media coverage of the potential or future accession of Turkey has raised

questions of race, ethnicity and religion in relation to France’s perception of what the EU
should be. While these topics are important to the future of Europe, evidence suggests

that these reasons were secondary concerns but not the primary motivations for the
French rejection of the EU Constitution. Instead, the French “Non” was primarily
motivated by French social and economic concerns. French voters rejected the Treaty

mainly because of fears of company relocation, the perception that the French economy
could not support further European integration, fear that unemployment would increase
with further European integration, and a fear that the new EU is becoming too liberal and

thus incompatible with sustaining social policy.

According to polls conducted by European Union and Ipsos (see Tables 2 and 3)
immediately following the vote in France on 30 of May 2005, voters most frequently

cited a concern that acceptance of the EU Constitution would lead to more relocations of
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Table 2. The Motivations of the No Vote by Socio-Demographic Variables
%
The economic situation
in France is too
weak/there is too much
unemployment in
France

19
20
17

%
Will cause
loss of
employment
and
relocation
of French
companies
31
28
33

16
15
15
16

16
23
18
17

36
26
36
28

18
22
29
29

16

18

17

27

14

277
139

19
18

17
8

24
14

29
38

23
22

308

17

17

16

30

31

0
776

0
18

0
16

0
19

0
31

0
26

221

18

17

19

31

29

238
174
99
40

24
14
12
13

15
19
10
10

22
18
15
10

31
33
31
20

26
26
20
21

430
62

17
21

20
32

23
29

31
37

24
26

309

18

17

21

29

24

175
104
49
98

19
22
14
15

9
8
8
9

8
6
8
17

34
33
37
30

27
25
35
26

France

Total

%
Opposes
President

%
Not
enough
social
Europe

%
Economically
speaking, the
draft is too
liberal

France
Male
Female
Age
18-24
25-39
40-54
55+
Profession/
Occupation
Selfemployed
Employees
Manual
workers
Without
work
Voted
Yes
No
Moment of
Choice
Announceme
nt
Early
Last weeks
Week before
Day of vote
Party
Proximity
Left
Communist
Party
Socialist
Party
Right
UMP/UDF
FN
NSP/ DK

776
378
398

18
18
18

16
17
14

89
230
238
219

7
16
21
21

51

26
21
30

Adapted from: The European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in France. Flash
Eurobarometer 171 Eurobarometer. June 2005. [online survey]; available from
http://europa.eu.int/comm/pub lic_opinion/flash/fl17 l_en.pdf.
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Table 3. Motivations of the No vote according to IPSOS poll

Unhappy with
economic
situation in
France
Constitution too
liberal
economically
Will permit the
negotiation of a
better
Constitution

Total %
52

PCF %
57

PS%
54

Greens %
59

40

57

49

50

39

44

47

55

Note: Several responses are possible. For example, 52 percent of those polled cited
"Unhappy with the economic situation in France” as one of the motivations for voting
against the Constitution, but voters were allowed to name more than one reason for
voting against the Constitution.
Source: Referendum: le Non des Classes Actives, des Classes Populaires et Moyennes,
et du_Peuple de Gauche. Canal Ipsos. 2 Jun 2005.[online organization]; available from:
http://www.ipsos.fr/ canalipsos/articles/1545.asp?rubld=17
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French companies, that it would negatively affect an already weak economic situation in
France, or that the Constitution is too liberal as justifications for voting No. The vote on

the Constitution had a relatively high turnout rate according to Eurobarometer of 693

percent, showing that this vote was an important issue to the majority of the French
population. The two previous French referenda on European issues had turnout rates of

60.4 percent in 1972 and 69.7 percent in 1992. The European elections of June 2004 only
had a rate of 42.8 percent.5 An IPSOS survey showed that 26 percent of conversations in

January, 48 percent in March and 83 percent in May were centered on the European
Constitution.6 Thus, it is possible to conclude from the low abstention rate and the public

interest in the Constitution that this vote was an important event for a majority of French
citizens.
Results from both the Eurobarometer and IPSOS polls show that the No vote

received about 55 percent, with 45 percent of voters voting in favor. People aged 40-54,
18-24 and manual workers seemed to be motivated to vote against the constitution

primarily because of a fear that its ratification would have caused more unemployment
and relocations while people aged 40 or above and who were without a profession voted

against the Treaty because they felt the economic situation in France would have been
negatively affected by accepting the Constitution. 7 According to IPSOS, the majority of
people who voted against the Constitution gave the reason that they were unhappy with

the economic and social situation in France (the IPSOS poll did not offer relocations as a

5 The European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in France. Flash Eurobarometer 171 Eurobarometer.
June 2005. 4; [online survey]; available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/flash/fll71_en.pdf.
6 Gaetane Ricard-Nihoul, “The French No vote on 29 May 2005: understanding and action,” Notre Europe
44, 2005, 3 [journal online]; available from http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr.; [online report]; (accessed 2
November 2005).
7 Ibid.,7.
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reason). The second reason most commonly cited by those who voted No according to
IPSOS was that the Constitution was too liberal economically. The third most cited
reason was that the No vote would have allowed a renegotiation of the Constitution. The
Left had argued during the campaign that a No vote would have allowed the drafting of a
more “social” Constitution.8 Thus, concern about unemployment and relocations,

concern that the economy in France was too weak, concern that the constitution was too

liberal economically, and concern that a “social” Europe would not be created with this
constitution were cited the most frequently as reasons for the No vote.
Both the Eurobarometer poll and the IPSOS poll provided detailed socio

demographic information about the voters. The important conclusion to draw from the

results of these polls is that they show very similar motivations for refusing the
Constitution and tend to vary only because the reasons offered to voters to explain their
refusal were slightly different. According to both the Eurobarometer and IPSOS polls,

different sections of society supported the No vote. The 18-24 year old group and

manual workers especially chose unemployment/relocation as a reason to vote against the
constitution.9 In the IPSOS poll, those who were unemployed showed strong support for
the No vote as well as employees in both the public and private sector and the self

employed. 10 It is important to note that voters who were retired or who had a higher
income tended to vote in favor of the Constitution. Those of working age were generally

against the Constitution.

8 See table 3.
9 The European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in France. Flash Eurobarometer 171 Eurobarometer.
June 2005. [online survey]; available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/pub lic_opinion/flash/fll71_en.pdf.
10 According to the French national statistics bureau are those people without employment who are able to
and actively looking for work. (“Il s’agit des personnes sans emploi au moment de 1’enquete,
immédiatement disponibles et a la recherche d’un emploi”).
Source : “France, Portrait Social 2003-2004,” INSEE (Paris: INSEE, 2003) 162.
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According to both the Eurobarometer and Ipsos polls, there was solid support for
the No vote according to party affiliation. Voters affiliated with a political party which

had generally shown support either for or against the Constitution during the campaign or
in the past tended to vote according to the party stance. 94 percent of extreme left voters
who were polled voted against the Constitution. 98 percent of Communist party affiliated
voters who were polled were also against the Treaty. The Socialist Party (PS) results

were the exception. The party had undergone a division, with some members breaking
away from the official party stance in favor of the treaty to support the No campaign. The
result (most likely influenced by the schism in the PS) was that voters affiliated with the

Socialist Party voted 56 percent No and 44 percent yes. The 56 percent who voted against
the Treaty formed the largest portion of the No vote within the group of left-affiliated

voters. Left-affiliated voters formed the largest group of No voters out of all No voters
(see table 1). Thus, it is possible to conclude that the Socialist Party (PS) voters made up

the largest portion of the No vote, and that the highest percentage of PS-affiliated voters
were against the Constitution because of a fear of company relocation and unemployment

fears (or with IPSOS economic fears in general).
There is also evidence that the campaign for the Constitution was an important

factor in determining voters’ final decisions. About 40 percent of voters made up their
minds about how they would vote either in the last weeks of the campaign or on the day

before the vote according to the Eurobarometer poll.11 Furthermore, polling during the
campaign showed that support for the Constitution fluctuated with the public debates and

’’The European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in France. Flash Eurobarometer 171
Eurobarometer. June 2005. [online survey]; available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/pub
lic_opinion/flash/fl 171 _en.pdf..
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appearances of various politicians on TV. For instance, support for the No vote increased

on two occasions. One was after a televised interview with President Chirac during which
he had appeared unable to provide a solution to unemployment and relocation problems.

The second was an appearance by former EU Commission President Jacques Delors who
supported a “Plan B” if the Constitution failed to pass.

This Plan B would primarily be

a Constitution that was less liberal in terms of trade policies. Therefore the campaign
seemed to play an important role for about 40 percent of voters who did not make up

their minds until just before the Referendum took place according to the Eurobarometer
results. This is significant because certain issues emerged repeatedly in the campaign
debates and media coverage during the campaign such as the fear of relocation, which
most likely had an effect on the way in which the French voted.

In a poll conducted by IPSOS in May 2005, the voting results of the French
population are contrasted to the results of the Maastricht treaty vote in 1992. Almost all
the different sectors of the population categorized by profession increased in support for
the No vote; the most significant increases since the 1992 referendum are in the

management groups (38 percent at Maastricht vs. 53 percent in 2005), the employee
group (53 percent in 1992 to 67 percent in 2005), and the manual worker category (from

61 percent in 1992 to 79 percent in 2005). Those who are public employees increased
from 49 percent in 1992 to 64 percent in 2005 in favor of the No vote. Also, there was a
difference in the groups of people who opposed the 2005 referendum in terms of party

affiliation. Whereas in 1992, 70 percent of voters affiliated with the extreme left voted

12 “Intentions de Vote. Referendum sur la ratification du traite établissant une Constitution pour l’Europe :
les intentions de vote realises par les instituts Ipsos, BVA, CSA, Ifop, Louis Harris, Sofres." Referendum:
Ie Non des Classes actives, des Classes Populaires et Moyennes, et du peuple de gauche. Canal Ipsos. 2
June 2005.[online organization] available from: http://www.ipsos.fr/referendum/iv_tous instituts.htm
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against the treaty, 94 percent of extreme-left voters opposed the constitution in 2005.

The Communist Party (PCF) had a significant increase from 81 percent in 1992 to 98
percent in 2005 (but the extreme parties of France have a general history of being anti
European in voting).13 This is generally because they are against any supranational
entities like the EU or they fear immigration from the newly enlarged union. The
Socialist Party went from 22 percent in 1992 to 56 percent “No” in 2005.14 It is possible
to conclude that the left formed the largest group in opposition to the Treaty. The PS no

voters were the largest percent within the Left. Also, the left represented the “extra” No
voters who had voted in favor of the Maastricht referendum but now voted against the
Constitution. Most PS affiliated voters against the Constitution cited

relocation/unemployment concerns or a weak French economic situation in general as
their motivation. Therefore, because so many No voters were motivated by
unemployment fears or economic concerns in general, a discussion of this issue is
relevant.

13Ricard-Nihoul, “The French No,” 35.
14 Referendum: le Non des Classes Actives, des Classes Populaires et Moyennnes, et du
Peuple de Gauche. Canal Ipsos. 2 Jun 2005.[online organization]; available from: http://www.ipsos.fr/
canalipsos/articles/1545 .asp?rubld= 17.
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2. Unemployment Fears in a Liberal EU
‘Unemployment’ is mentioned constantly and all the time. Today,
however, the term has lost its true meaning, for it covers a phenomenon
quite different from the utterly obsolete one it claims to describe. Yet
elaborate and usually fallacious promises are made in its name, hinting at
tiny quantities of jobs acrobatically launched (at reduced wages) on the
labor market. The percentages are derisory in view of the millions of
people excluded from the labor market, and, at this rate, likely to remain
so for decades. And by then, what kinds of a state will they, society and
the labor market be in?15 — Viviane Forrester, The Economic
Horror.

The unemployment situation is especially important in understanding French fears

of relocation and liberal policies. This is mainly because these issues are perceived to
threaten jobs and exacerbate the unemployment crisis.16 Unemployment has been a
persistent problem in France now for decades. The employment level has become a main
problem for the Chirac administration, which has not succeeded in lowering the

15 Viviane Forrester, The Economic Horror, trans. Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (MA: Polity Press, 1999), 3
16“And as B. Cautres (Lauren, Sauyer, 2005) notes, ‘confidence in EU integration is very closely related to
the economic climate. In particular, we can see a connection over time between pro-European attitudes and
the unemployment curve.’ added to fact is that confidence in government’s capacity to counteract
unemployment is at a historic low.”
This fact becomes important for this study when trying to determine why the French fear the EU will
exacerbate unemployment in Franc. Even though the unemployment rate was high in the Maastricht treaty
year vote, unemployment was not given as a reason for voting No. This leads to the discussion of the EU’s
new focus on liberal policies and the recent enlargement.

A. Laurent and N. Sayer, Le Referendum de Ratification du Traite Constitutionnel Européen: Comprendre
le “Non” français, Les Cahiers du CEVIPOF, n 42, (July, 2005) cited in Ricard-Nihoul, “The French No,”
14.
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unemployment rate. Unemployment increased dramatically from 2.7 percent in 1974 to
9.1 percent in 1983. It saw a slight decrease from 10.4 percent in 1987 to 8.9 percent in

1990.17 While unemployment18 has decreased since 1994, France at 10.1 percent still has

one of the highest rates of unemployment of all the OECD countries in 2005.19 This helps

to explain why many French voted No. Long-term unemployment began a steady

increase after 1974, and by 1985 21 percent of the unemployed were jobless for more
than one year. The average length of unemployment was 16 months in 1998.20 Today,

France has a long-term unemployment rate of 41.6 percent as a percent of total

unemployment while youth unemployment as a percent of the youth labor force stands at
22.7 percent.21 It is also important to note that areas in France that had a high

unemployment rate during the vote tended to vote No with the exception of Pays de la
Loire where the Yes barely passed by less than one percent. This seems to result from
this area being close to the Ile de France region (see table 4).
Certain groups are also more likely to experience unemployment in France. There

is a general trend of unemployment for those aged 21-30, who represent half the
unemployed; for this age group the risk of being unemployed is 3.5 times higher than

17 Jean-Claude Barbier. “The French Social Protection System: Path Dependencies and Social Coherence.”
The Year 2000 International Research Conference on Social Security. Helsinki September 2000.
International Social Security Association. 10. [online] available from
<http://www.issa.int/pdf/helsinki2000/topic 1/2barbier.pdf>
18 The unemployed according to the OECD definition are persons of working age who, in a specified
period, are without work and are both available for and are actively seeking work. The labor force
comprises the employed, the unemployed and all members of the armed forces. This series is the official
unemployment rate. The unemployment rate refers to the number of persons unemployed according to ILO
(International Labor Organization)definitions, as a percentage of the total labor force.
Official Site of the OECD: http://stats.oecd.org/mei/default.asp?lang=e&subject=10&country=FRA
19 Unemployment OECD in Figures 2005 edition. OECD. (July 2005). 20; [online] available from:
http://213.253.134.29/oecd/pdfs/browseit/0105061 E.PDF.
20 Peter Taylor-Gooby. Welfare States Under Pressure. (CA: Sage Publications Inc, 2001) 62.
21 Salvador Juan and Didier Le Gall, eds, Conditions et Genres de Vie (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2001), 20 ;
Youth are persons under age 25
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Table 4. Vote Results by Region in France, Closeness of Vote, and Unemployment Rate
Table 1
Region
Alsace

yes %
53.44

No %
46.56

Auvergne

42.43

57.57

Aquitaine

42.85

57.15

Bourgogne

41.48

58.52

Bretagne

50.9

49.1

Centre

Champagne-Ardenne

Corse

43

57

42.91

57.09

42.3

57.7

42.19

57.81

53.96

46.04

Languedoc-Roussillon

37.63

62.37

Limousin

40.78

59.22

Lorraine

43.56

56.44

Midi-Pyrenees

42.85

57.15

Nord-Pas-de-Calais

35.11

64.89

Basse-Normandie

44.76

55.24

Franche-Comté
Ile-de-France

35.58

64.42

50.12

49.88

Picardie

34.98

65.02

Poitou-Charentes

44.66

55.34

Provence-Alpes-Côte-d'Azur (PACA)

41.21

58.79

Rhône-Alpes

48.38

51.62

Haute-Normandie
Pays-de-la-Loire

%
difference
6.88
-15.14
-14.3
-17.04
1.8
-14
-14.18
-15.4
-15.62
7.92
-24.74
-18.44
-12.88
-14.3
-29.78
-10.48
-28.84
0.24
-30.04
-10.68
-17.58
-3.24

Unemployment
rate
8.6

8.5
10.1
8.7
8.1
8.8
10.3
10.8
8.6
10
13.7
7.9
9.9
9,8
13.1
9.5
10.9
13.1
10.8
9.4
11.9
8.8

Source: "L’apres-Referendum : les consequences du non 29 Mai 2005. Les Résultats par
department et par region," France 2 Groupe France Televisions. 30 May 2005. Official
Site of France 2 Group Television [online] (accessed 4 January 2005).
available from:
http://referendumconstitutioneuropeenne.france2.fr/1 1018058fr.php#paral 1065525.

Note that the areas with the highest unemployment rates tended to vote against the
Constitution; the No vote won in those areas by a wide margin.
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those aged 30-35.22 The 11.0 percent unemployment rate of women is higher than that of

men, which is 9.3 percent. According to a November 2005 poll from Ipsos, 6 out of 10

young people in France under age 25 expect to experience a period of unemployment in
their career, even those who feel confident in their professional future.22
23 Those who are

unemployed or those who have a higher chance of being unemployed chose to reject the

Constitution from a fear of unemployment and those of working age showed less support

for the Constitution due to unemployment fears in the Eurobarometer poll. For example,

54 percent of voters ages 18-24 and 48 percent of those ages 25-39 voted against the
Treaty citing unemployment concerns. 24

22 Ibid, 40.
23 Craplet, Cristelle, "Les 20-25 ans ne croient plus au modèle sociale français" Canal Ipsos. Official site of
IPSOS. [online] (accessed 6 January 2005) available from:
http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/articles/1733.asp?rubId=21
24 The European Constitution: Post-Referendum Survey in France. Flash Eurobarometer 171
Eurobarometer. June 2005. [online survey]; available from http://europa.eu.int/comm/pub
lic_opinion/flash/fll 71_en.pdfalso 79% blue collar workers voted non accord to IPSOS (+18 from
Maastricht), 67% white collar workers (+I4pts from Maastricht) and 71% of jobseekers non (+ 12 pts from
Maastricht)
Ricard-Nihoul, “The French No,” 20.
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2.1 French Social Protection
Both historian Timothy B. Smith, in his study on the French welfare state and

OECD analysts argue that the main causes of the high unemployment rate in France are
the highly protectionist policies that exist and are implemented in the name of sustaining

a French welfare state or a French social model.

Smith argues that any attempt to

decrease the level of social protection or social benefits in France usually results in
massive discontent or protest in the name of ‘Solidarity.’25
26 There have been protests in

the past decade as the administration has tried to gradually liberalize the economy and
certain social areas such as pension plans.27 Sophie Meunier, a research associate from

Princeton University, argues in her study of how globalization challenges France that the
government is aware of French fears of reform. The French perceive certain reforms as a

dismantling of social protection, and the government has therefore tried to complete

25 “Key Challenges Facing France Summary Chapter 1” OECD Economic Survey of France 16 June 2005,
OECD; [online Journal] available at
http ://www.oecd.org/document/40/0,2340,en_2649_201185_34991720_ 1 _ 1 _ 1 _ 1,00-html
26 Smith defines Solidarity as a country that would in an ideal situation “require regular sacrifice for the
common good. A solidaristic society is one which redistributes wealth to low-wage earners and opens up
the doors of social mobility. A solidaristic society pays the price for its solidarity in the here and now,
instead of leaving the bill to future generations. A solidaristic society spreads risk (and jobs) equitably...”
Timothy B. Smith. France in Crisis, Welfare, Inequality, and Globalization since 1980. (UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2004) 8.
27lbid., 61-64

Day 25

policy reform “by stealth.”28 According to Meunier, this is done by using anti-liberal
rhetoric while simultaneously pursuing privatization of the economy.

France has been built on the tradition that a strong central government should be

responsible for the well-being of the population.28
29 To this end, the French welfare state
has grown through different stages. In 1974 there was an increase in unemployment
insurance benefits and the retirement age decreased from age 65 to 60. This latter change

is known as the “social treatment” (early retirement). Also, in the 1980s, a program for

creating government-subsidized jobs for the young and long-term unemployed was
implemented. There was a minor decrease in social spending from 1984 to 1993, but it
increased yet again in the 1990s when there was resurgence in the belief that the French

welfare state should expand. In 1992 all unemployment insurance benefits were covered
by the Allocation Unique Degressive (AUD). This insurance benefit is payable only for a

limited period of time. Reform of the AUD meant fewer benefits and the RMI (Revenue
Minimum D’Insertion) became the safety-net for the long term unemployed. In 1998, the
work week in France was reduced to 35 hours on the grounds that work should be divided

among more workers.30 There are also special contracts for workers limiting the terms
upon which a person may be employed. These contracts include the CDI (contrat a durée

indeterminee/contract for undefined amount of time) and the CDD (contrat a durée
determine/contract of defined amount of time).31 These social protection laws were

enacted in theory to protect against poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion. Most

28 Philip Gordon and Sophie Meunier. The French Challenge Adapting Globalization. (VA: Brookings
Institution Press, 2001), 14.
29 Sophie Meunier. France, Globalization and Global Protectionism. Paper prepared for Conference “France
in Europe, Europe in France.” December 3-5, 1999. Center for European Studies, Harvard University. 17.
(online] available from: http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/Meunier.pdf.
30 Taylor Gooby 65-67.
31 Salvador Juan and Didier Le Gall, eds, Conditions et Genres de Vie, (Paris : L’Harmattan, 2001), 42.
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French approve of such state regulation. For instance, in a 1993 poll, 53 percent of those
who were polled felt that the state did not intervene enough in the economy.32 Also,

attempts to cut back the amount of legislation protecting jobs or other social policies are

generally met with protests. For example, in 1995 when Prime Minister Juppe tried to
reduce state control ofjobs and pensions, there were massive street protests in response.33

Even today’s street protests are in response to a bill that would make it easier to fire

young workers.34 Therefore, the French belief in social protection policies was another

issue for French No voters, who feared the EU was becoming too centered on liberal
trade policies and not enough on ensuring social protection.

The French feared that their social model would not be able to compete in a newly
enlarged Europe if the EU was based solely on liberal trade principles where the cheapest

and most competitive are the winners. The EU has recently reinforced its commitment to

make the union a more liberal trading zone, and “competitiveness” has become the
overall objective.35 Evidence of this new commitment to make the EU more competitive
can be observed in the so called Lisbon Strategy.

32 Gordon and Meunier, 101.
33 Barbier, 14.
34 BBC News 7 March 2006, [online] available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4781880.stm
35 "Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Scope and Effects of Company
Relocations." Official Journal of the European Union, 25 November 2005. Article 1.1 [online] available
from http://europa.eu
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2.2 The Lisbon Strategy and Liberalization
The Lisbon Strategy was a project undertaken and developed by EU leaders at

Lisbon in March 2000 to increase growth and employment. The goal was for the EU “to

become by 2010 the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the
world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater

social cohesion.”36 Three of the five areas of policy reform that the strategy recommends
concern free trade and the market, reform of the internal services market, and reform of

the business climate.37 It is probable that the Lisbon reforms concern policies that the
French would not approve of modifying. This is partly because the Lisbon

recommendations call for the removal of legislation that the French see as ensuring social
protection.

The first policy reform area of the Lisbon Strategy concerns the internal market,

but it is controversial for France because it implies that company relocations are a
benefit. The EU emphasizes the fact that increased industrial production for some areas

from relocation is positive, because it includes the transfer of technology and increases

36 Report from the high Level Group, Facing the Challenge The Lisbon Strategy from growth and
employment November 2004, by Wim Kok, chairman (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 2004), 7.
37Ibid., 18.
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the competitiveness for those businesses.38 The EU also focuses on the social aspect,

insisting that “social decline” and a natural industrial restructuring are not
“synonymous.”39 As the EU Commission sees it, relocation is part of the natural trend

that occurs both in an internal market such as the EU and in a globalized world. It is
beneficial because it increases competitiveness and lowers prices for EU consumers.

Some French consider globalization and competition to be the culprits responsible
for relocations, high unemployment, and the loss of the ability of a state to provide social
protection. Smith in his study on the French welfare state in crisis points out that

globalization is often held responsible for all the domestic economic problems of France
such as the high unemployment rate.40 Many on the Left argue that the pressures of

globalization prevent states from providing better social legislation to deal with social
exclusion and with the effects of liberal free trade (such as relocation).41 Meunier in her

study on the challenges of globalization for France notes that the European Union itself
was the precursor of globalization.42 She also points out that the recent privatizations
such as Air France and France Telecom together with reforms of the welfare state in
France have been completed “by stealth” due to the common French opinion that more

state regulation is better. She argues that French politicians have led a campaign against
liberal policies while at the same time moving toward more privatization and

deregulation.43 In an interview with President Chirac during the campaign for the

Constitution, one French voter asked if the President did not think that the support for the

38 Official Journal Article 1.12.
39 Ibid., Article 1.13.
40 Smith, 55.
41 See L. Fabius, “Question Ouvert,” for example.
42 Gordon and Meunier, 71.
43 Meunier, 12 and Gordon and Meunier, 22.
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No vote was due to a “double discourse” which his administration had led on
globalization and liberal trade policies.44 She mentioned that on one hand the President

claims he is against liberal policies but his Prime Minister (during the Referendum), Jean-

Pierre Raffarin, had recently pushed through reform of the pension system and more
privatizations. Thus, there was some sense of discontent over this issue, which became a

main motivation of the No vote.

The Socialist campaign for the No vote also argued that unfair competition from
lower wage countries without the proper social legislation could be extremely harmful to
the French social and economic situation. It was blamed in the polls for exacerbating the

unemployment situation. It is therefore unlikely that France will perceive the

deconstruction of social legislation as a benefit. This is because the French No voters are

more likely to see the breakdown of labor protection laws as exposing employees to the
harsh environment of a liberal market.

The first part of the internal market policy reform area of the Lisbon Strategy calls

for the creation of a single market for services, known as the Bolkestein Directive. The
Bolkestein Directive was proposed by Fritz Bolkestein, the EU Commissioner for the

Internal Market, Taxation and Customs from 2000 to 2004. It called for an internal single

market for services. This market accounts for between 60-70 percent of the economic

activity in the Union. The EU reasoned that because the services sector is so large in

44 Jacques Chirac, Debat du President de la République.
"I wanted to ask you this question : is it that you don’t think that the increase in support for the No vote is a
product/ victim of the ‘double discourse’ that you have on liberalism? You have shown that you are
against liberalism or at least ultra liberal globalization. However, it is not possible to say that the policies of
Jean Pierre-Raffarin (Prime Minister) aren’t liberal, extremely liberal either. We could say that the public
sector is on the brink of being privatized, we can’t say that the politics of this administration are a success,
unemployment increases, the purchasing power falls, you say that it is necessary to struggle against global
liberalism but in reality, the politics of this administration are liberal.”
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Europe, free trade and competition in that area would be beneficial.45 The objective of
the proposal was to create an internal market in services by removing all barriers to the
services sector between member states. While the official directive description claims to

exclude public services, critics of the directive point out that the only services which are
excluded are those where “the characteristic of remuneration is absent.” However, “since

access to a large number of public services requires the payment of fees, most fall within

the range of the directive.”46 This debate is important mainly because the public sector is
associated with social protection.47

Critics of the directive feared that specific company structures would be devised
to exploit the varying levels of regulation in the EU member states, mostly because of the

“country of origin principle” in Chapter III, Article 16 of the directive. The principle
states that: “Member states must ensure that providers are subject only to the national

provisions of their member state of origin.. .Member state of origin shall be responsible
for supervising the provider and the services provided by him, including services
provided by him in another member state” 48 Analysis of the implications of the policy

(from supporters) found there would be a number of benefits from allowing free trade in
the services sector including an increase in EU GDP, a lowering in the cost of services

and the creation of new jobs for the long term.49 The French fear of competition and job

45 Europa, official site of the European, Services Directive [online] available from
(europa.eu.int/comm./intemal_market/services/overview_en.htm>
46 Thomas Fritz, “Transforming Europe into a Special Economic Zone The EU’s Services Directive” Berlin
Working Group on Environment and Development- NGO Blue 21 July (2004), 3. [online] available from
http://www.spectrezine.org/europe/Fritz-vs-Bolkestein-EN.pdf (this is an anti-services directive document)
47 Gueldry, Michel R. France and European Integration Toward a Transnational Polity ? CT: Praeger,
2001,71.
48

Thomas Fritz. “Transforming Europe into a Special Economic Zone The EU Services Directive.” Berlin
Working Group on Environment and Development. NGO Blue 21, July 2004. 12.
49 Official Site of CEPA, Center for European Policy Analysis [online] available from:
http://cepa.ncpa.org/archive/does-europe-need-the-polish-plumber (accessed 4 January 2006).
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loss was embodied in the image of a ‘Polish Plumber’ in the media (see Figure 1). The
French government recognized that this aspect was becoming a major threat to the Yes

campaign in France because of a fear of unfair competition in the services sector. On 21
March 2005, demonstrators from all over the EU including France met to protest the
Services Directive.50 On 22 March 2005 at a summit in Brussels on economic reform,

President Chirac stated that the Directive was ‘unacceptable’ for France and convinced
the Commission to revise the proposal.5152Nonetheless, the fact that the EU had even

proposed the directive in the first place demonstrated its new reorientation and
commitment to free trade and deregulation.
Even though the EU reasoned that the creation of the services directive would be

beneficial, the French still feared a large influx of foreign workers would occur and

threaten the economic and social well-being of French citizens. According to their
argument, French social and economic policies could not exist when so many French jobs
were forced to compete with an influx of workers not subject to French standards.

52

Thus, a pattern emerges where the French argue that a good European social model
cannot exist when French jobs are threatened by foreign workers and competition from

low wage countries such as Poland.

The second major policy reform of the Lisbon Strategy with which the French
took issue was “the business climate” cause. This reform called for the reduction of the

50 World Socialist Web Site 21 March 2005 [online] available from
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/brus-m21.shtml (accessed 5 February 2006).
51 Interactive table at IPSOS on the French campaign [online] available from
http://www.ipsos.fr/referendum/iv_tous_instituts.htm and BBC 22 March 2005 [online] available from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4374007.stm
52 for example Pierre Moscovici, “Il faut établir un rapport de force avec le conseil.” Official site of the
Parti Socialiste 16 February 2006. [online] available from http://www.parti-socialiste.fr/tikimdex.php?page=060216_bolkestein_itwmoscovici
The author explains the PS’s resistance to liberal policies resulting in social dumping.
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Figure 1: The Polish Plumber

Source: MSNBC.com, Poster from Polish National Tourist Office in France. [online]
available from: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8396626/
This poster from the Polish National Tourist Office in France is representative of the
Fears of the French against a free trade internal services market. It reads “I’m staying in
Poland.”
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“administrative burden” and “facilitating the rapid start-up of new enterprises and

creating an environment more supportive to businesses”53 However, in France these
reforms were seen as breaking down protective and beneficial legislation, doubly so

because they were recommended at time when France has been going through a

wrenching process of privatizations. The EU concluded that there were too many “rules
and regulations imposed on businesses,” and although these regulations are made with

good intentions, they ultimately hinder efficiency and production.54 In the words of the
EU: “a balance must be struck between regulation and competition.” The reforms call for

a drastic reduction in “the time, effort and cost of setting up a business by the end of
2005.”55 However, as Smith notes in his book on the French welfare state, the French
benefit from heavy labor laws and regulation that make it virtually impossible to be fired
once hired and that highly regulate the time allowed to work—for example the 35-hour-

work-week law.56 These laws are seen as part of the social protection legislation in
France and are defended in the name of Solidarity.57 These types of regulations would

most likely have to be eliminated or modified in order to comply with the Lisbon
Strategy. A study from 1996 shows that the French would most likely reject the

modification of legislation that they consider to be beneficial to the social situation in
France. Those interviewed for the poll who were affiliated with the Left in France were
the least likely to hold “le poids des charges socials” (the cost of social benefits and

53 Report from the High Level Group, Facing the Challenge The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and
Employment November 2004, by Wim Kok, Chairman. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of
the European Communities, 2004. 7.
54 Gordon and Meunier, 29.
55 Ibid., 30.
56 Smith, 3.
57 see Smith, 42.
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legislation) as explanation for unemployment.58 In another example, L. Fabius, the PS
no- campaign leader, asserted that the European Bank caused problems for member states

because it is separate from any political entity, and it only deals with the economic
aspects of the European Union. In theory, when a country fails to meet the ‘no more than

3% of GDP’ requirement for deficit spending, sanctions are imposed. Fabius argued that
this restriction hinders a government’s ability to fund social legislation, which would help

a government deal with unemployment. Therefore, he voted against the Constitution in

order to vote for a more Social Europe.58
59
The liberalization of the EU, evidenced by the Lisbon Strategy, was thus a
concern for many French no voters. However, the EU has been in the process of lowering

trade barriers for decades. In the 1980s, French Commission President Jacques Delors
(1985-1995) was responsible for initiating the creation of the Single Market which called

for the lowering of all non-tariff trade barriers within the EU. Delors was committed to

the prospect of social cohesion within the Union, but he also believed in the benefits of
free trade. In addition to the creation of the Single Market, Britain has been an important

player in the EU for liberalization. British policy makers pushed for further liberalization

since the 1979 election of Margaret Thatcher and the support for liberal policies has
continued with current British Prime Minister Tony Blair. It was Tony Blair who first

suggested the summit at Lisbon and he remarked in a speech to the British Parliament in

2000 on the reform of the Union:

58 La Chaise, Guillaume. Crise de l’Emploi et Fractures Politiques Les Opinions des Françaisface au
Chômage. Paris : Presses de Sciences Po, 1996. 189.
59 L ’Humanite 17 May 2005.
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For the EU, at Lisbon in March, we will reach a decision point on
economic reform. Does Europe continue with the old social model, that
has an attitude to social legislation and welfare often rooted in the 1960s
and 1970s or does it recognize that the new economy demands a re
direction of European economic policy for the future? I would like to see
Lisbon mark a definitive turning point towards the reform agenda,
retaining the values of the European Social Model, but changing their
application radically for the modem world. 60

There has been a push toward more liberal policy within the EU supported by

Britain; the focus on increasing employment and economic growth through trade

liberalization has become a primary focus of the current Barroso Commission

(2004-2009).61 The Commission has recently reemphasized the need to

implement the Lisbon recommendations to strengthen European employment and
growth overall.

In addition to the liberalization of the EU, France has seen some liberal policies
enacted at the national level. Since the economic “U-turn” of 1983 in France under
former President Mitterrand and former Finance Minister Jacques Delors (1981-1984),
France has seen a gradual trend of privatization and liberalization. In 1986, the Chirac

Government enhanced the trend of privatizations and ended price controls. While there
was a brief period in 1988 when privatizations were slowed by the socialist government

because former Prime Minister Chirac lost his position, the Single Market liberalization

policies continued at the EU level. The 1990s saw the French private sector expand
through mergers and internationalization.62 Delors had left his position as Finance

60 Speech by Tony Blair, 18 January 2000, World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, [online]
available from http://www.numberl0.gov.uk/output/Pagel508.asp
61 Official Site of the Barroso Commission, Europa. [online] available from
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commission_barroso/president/index_en.htm
62 Alain Guyomarch, Howard Machin, Peter A. Hall, and Jack Hayward. Developments in French Politics
2. (Great Britain: Palgrave, 2001), 87.
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Minister to become the Commission President because he believed the future success of
France was tied to the future of Europe.
However, many French politicians and policy makers have used the European

Union and globalization in general as an explanation for unpopular policies in France.

Meunier and Gordon point out that while France was and still is in the midst of
liberalization and privatizations due to the pressures of trade within the EU and

globalization, politicians have used anti-liberal rhetoric.63 As Mitchell Smith, Professor

of Political Science and co-director of the European Union Center at the University of
Oklahoma notes, the claim that “the Commission made me do it” is a frequent excuse

given by politicians and policy makers to pursue liberalization without giving the
appearance of actually approving of it.64 Smith notes that former Prime Minister Lionel
Jospin (1997-2002) remarked that his primary concern was to preserve the “social market

economy” and to resist pressures to have a “market society” based on “jungle
capitalism.”65 Nonetheless, under the Jospin administration, the state privatized

companies that were thought to be “untouchable” such as Thomson-CSF and Credit

Lyonnais. Air France and France Telecom were partially privatized.66 Therefore, the
actual liberalization with which so many French No voters took issue is actually a trend
that has been ongoing since the 1980s. It is the result of an emphasis on a common
internal market in the EU as well as liberal policies that have been pursued to some extent

within France.

63 Meunier, 12 and Gordon and Meunier, 22.
64 Mitchell Smith, "The Commission Made Me Do It: The European Commission as a Strategic Asset in
Domestic Politics" cited in Stephen George and Ian Bache, Politics in the European Union, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 40-41.
65 Timothy Smith, 5.
66 Gordon and Meunier, 22.
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3. Relocations and Public Debate

"JVC, Continental, Alcatel, St microelectronics, Alstom...these
names represent companies who all share a common trait: all have closed
factories or locations in France and have relocated their production
abroad... We have seen relocations of companiesfor 20 years, and this is
certainly going to continue. ”67
Anyone who has been in France during the past 10-15 years will have heard some

discussion of company relocations. The issue became one of the main rallying points for

the Left in its campaign against the Constitution in France in 2005. It was also an issue
that the media and public debate covered during the campaign. In order to understand

why this issue has become such a focus of concern, it is useful to first look at the past
history of the coverage of this trend in public debate. Then, it is useful to observe the

attention devoted to this topic in the months during the campaign before the referendum.

Public discussion of relocation started at about the same time that the debate on

globalization emerged in France. This is not surprising, because it is a process that is
attributed to globalization.68 The topic was mentioned so many times in French
newspapers from 1990-2005 that it is too large a search to cover for most news/media
67 Information Site managed by La Documentation Française, “Dossier sur La Délocalisation” (accessed 4
January 2005) [online] available from http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualitevp/dossier/delocalisation.htm.
("JVC, Continental, Alcatel, St microelectronics, Alstom...Ces noms désignent des entreprises dont le
point commun est d’avoir ferme des établissements implantes en France tout en délocalisant leur
production vers l’etranger... Nous assistons a des delocalisations d’entreprises depuis une vingtaine
d’années, et ce mouvement va certainement se poursuivre.")
68 Gordon and Meunier, 74.
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search engines; a Lexis-Nexis search of the topic in French news for this time period is

too large for the service to cover. During this time period, it was mentioned in both the
headlines and in general discussion within the text (See Table 5). In 2004 and 2005 the

appearances of the word relocation increase dramatically, which is indicative of the
attention given to this topic during the recent enlargement of the EU (See Table 6). In

2004 alone, a search recalls 4,144 appearances of the term.69 A separate search of the
term “relocation” plus the word “unemployment” and/or salaries in 2004 also returns a
very high number.70

There have been numerous studies of company relocation since the 1990s, but one
of the first major studies was the so-called Arthuis Report conducted by the French

Senate (under the direction of Senator Arthuis) and released in 1993. The report predicted
that the French economy would be severely damaged, ultimately losing three to five

million French jobs because of relocations.71 Nearly 500 articles on relocations and

Arthuis appeared in Le Monde in the following years.72 Throughout the 1990s the debate

in the media on delocalisation was covered in some of the most widely-read newspapers;
this influenced the public’s perception of relocations.

In the early 1990s, a newspaper that focused heavily on this topic was the

business daily Les Echos, which often reported either demonstrations against relocations
or statistics informing readers that employment was threatened.73 According to one story

from 1993, 56-80,000 jobs in information technology could be lost as a result of

69 See table5.
70 Ibid.
71 Gordon and Meunier, 30.
72 Lexis-Nexis
73 Is the leading financial daily newspaper in France according to Lexis- Nexis official description.
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Table 5. Frequency of Terms In the News

Research Terms

2000

2003

2004

Relocations
Of which Headlines
Relocations
+unemployment
Relocations + 35
Hours
Relocations + Wages
Relocations +
unemployment
+wages
Relocations
+ Unemployment
and/or wages

215
10
33

879
53
208

4144
453
859

20

57

500

30
9

138
51

709
224

54

295

1344

Adapted from : Guillaume Daudin and Sandrine Levasseur, “Offshore Relocations and
Emerging Countries Competition: Measuring the Effect on French Employment,” in
Competition from Emerging Countries, International Relocation and their Impacts on
Employment, 6. Observatoire Français des Conjunctures Economiques. (Paris, 2005).
[online] available from <http://www.euroframe.org>.
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Table 6. Frequency of the Appearance of "Relocation” in Various Newspapers
Year:
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

Le Monde
188
115
80
86
99
62
62
100
125
125
183
500
496

Source : Lexis-Nexis

La Tribune
159
130
154
135
159
120
116
132
118
90
116
more than 250
207

Les Echos
336
272
285
270
282
228
195
183
184
205
327
841
617

L'Express
28
13
10
21
16
13
9
19
23
21
24
96
62
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relocations. 74 Knowing that the French were exposed to stories like these in the daily

media helps explain in part why relocation became such an issue for the French
Referendum on the Constitution.
Relocation cases reported in the news from 1993-2000 were numerous. For
instance, in 1993, an article in Les Echos reported that the company Groupe Salmon-Arc-

en-Ciel was letting people go in a region that already felt the impact of deindustrialization
in the clothing and the shoe-making industries. Claude Martin, the head of the company,

made the prediction that this process of laying off workers would continue because it is
simply less expensive to produce in countries with lower wages. In this company’s case,

25 percent of its production was already relocated to Morocco, Portugal, Thailand and
Korea. The director of the Centre d’ Affaire Mode-Industries de Cholet (CAMI), Henry de

L’Espinay, blamed the fact that there is not enough regulation of imports as the cause of

relocation. L’Espinay also predicted that Poland would be the next place to host relocated
companies.74
75 This prediction was made in 1993, and a study of the public debate twelve

years later shows that this was a problem according to discussions of relocation in the
news: the recent enlargement of the EU played into fears of relocation because French No

voters feared that their industrial wages could not compete with the lower wage countries

of Eastern Europe.76
In 1996, one report highlighted the fact that the textile and clothing manufacturing

industry was rapidly disappearing and then noted that other sectors of the
manufacturing/production industry were likely to suffer the same fate because of

74 Tech Europe, 1 April 1993.
75 Les Echos 14 May 1993.
76 Katinka Barsysch, “Does Enlargement matter for the EU economy?" Centerfor European Reform (2003)
1 (online); available from: www.cer.org.
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company relocations to countries with lower wages. The article noted that the wages of

the French were four times higher than those of the South Koreans and 8 times higher
than those in Mexico. It also reported that since 1992, the newly admitted countries of
Italy, Spain, and Portugal would cause more relocations to occur.77 This prediction

shows a pattern of concern about relocation that accompanies discussions on enlargement
of the European Union.

Both the news and public debate in the past two years have reported on
government “solutions” to relocation. The Minister of Economics, Nicolas Sarkozy,

emphasized the fact that the government is trying to help France deal with this problem
by focusing on “flexibility” of the economy.78 This referred to the idea that there must be
new sectors of industry to fill those sectors that have relocated. It is based on the idea that
a trend of relocation is inevitable with competition from low wage countries such as
Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, and Romania. The government has also started giving

contracts to various regions of France; these contracts give technological support and
funding to areas that are considered to be extremely hurt by relocation in order to

reinvigorate the economy.79 The implementation of government solutions for relocations
no doubt contributed to a fear that relocation was widespread and that it was one of the

sources of unemployment. A review of the French newspaper Le Monde just before the
election in the months of March, April, and May shows that relocation became an

important issue during the campaign for the Referendum.

77 Les Echos, 11 December 1996.
78 Le Figaro Economie, 6 May 2004.
79 Lorenzi and Fotagne, 12
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3.1 The Campaign andLeMonde-. March, April, May
“ .. .He was staying to take the bet. Produce the same lamp, with a lower cost
price of more than 25 percent. Frederic Larivalle called a meeting of his
staff and demanded :‘that you either simplify the product to save the
company 30 percent in costs while staying within the normal expense
range by getting better terms with the suppliers or I am going to move to
China; by doing so I am sure to save 30 percent on my cost prices.”80
French Small Business Owner

An article appearing in Le Monde on 5 March 2005, two months before the

Referendum, entitled “Ma Petite Enterprise” (my small business) told the story of a
French small business owner, who discusses his day to day struggle to resist relocation.
In the end, he is forced to deal with a supplier in the East for a part he uses to make lamps
in order to keep the price of his product competitive. The owner wrote a letter to the
Liberation newspaper calling himself “un patron voyou mais par nécessité,” (a bad boss/
a lout/ but by necessity) in which he explains that he did all he possibly could and should

as a business owner; he paid his workers well, abided by the 35-hour-work-week

80 Le Monde, 5 March 2005. ("Restait a tenir le pari. Produire le meme luminaire, avec une baisse du prix
de revient de plus de 25 pourcent. Frederic Larivaille a reuni son " staff technique " et leur a fait
explicitement ce chantage : ‘soit vous arrivez a simplifier les produits et a nous faire faire 30 percent
d’economie tout en restant dans le cahier des charges, en négociant de meilleures conditions avec nos
foumisseurs habituels. Soit je vais en chine.’ Avec le plan de la piece, je suis sur de gagner 30 percent sur
mes prix de revient.")
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schedule, and yet he has been forced to accept the relocation of a supplier.81 The business
owner fears that he will eventually have to relocate his business. In March, two months

before the referendum, Jacques Génereux, an economist and prominent member of the
Socialist Party explained the idea that became a concern of many French voters: “After

Maastricht, there was no deepening of the political aspect, there was a privatization of

public services, a selling of education and health care, fiscal and social dumping, and

now relocations...” 82 He represents many French voters who voted against the

constitution because of what is seen as an overall liberalization of the EU where
relocations take place regularly, without a social aspect to accompany it. In the same

article, Génereux comments:
But those responsible (for relocations etc...) are not the Eastern
European Countries. They are the old EU-15, who started a process
contrary to that which was done before. Before, there was no reshaping of
Europe for the acceding countries, they were told the conditions necessary
for entering the union and we helped them to achieve those conditions. It
was a “equalizing” done from the top. Today, this is only done by harsh
competition.83

Thus, while he feels that enlargement has become a problem, it is not because of the
countries themselves who recently joined the Union, but rather that the EU has morphed
into an enlarged entity that is based only on liberal trade and that embraces relocations.

Two months before the vote, the General Director of Economic and Financial Affairs of
the EU Commission (La Direction Generale des Affaires Economiques et Financiers de la
Commission Europeen) released a note discussing the benefits of relocation—which Le
81 Literally a “lout,”/ a bad boss but by necessity
82 Le Monde, 30 March 2005. (“Seulement, après Maastricht, il n’y a pas eu d’approfondissement politique,
mais en revanche, une privatisation des services publics, une marchandisation de l’education et de la santé,
du dumping social et fiscal, et maintenant, des delocalisations...”)
83 Ibid.,(" Mais les responsables ne sont pas les pays de 1’est. Ce sont les Quinze, qui on engage un
processus contraire a ce qui se faisait avant. Auparavant, on ne refaçonnait pas le projet européen pour les
nouveaux arrivants, on leur énonçait les conditions d’entree et on les y aidait. C’était une harmonisation par
le haut. Aujourd’hui elle se fait par la concurrence.")
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Monde humorously titled “Happy Relocations” (Les Delocalisations Heureuses).8485
The

subject was so controversial that the note finally had to be withdrawn from circulation,
because the French vote was too close and the Commission realized relocations were

recognized to be a main fear of the public. In the note, the EU argued that relocations

increase competition, they have the same effect as an advance in technology, and while
deindustrialization means a loss of worker employment, it translates to an enormous leap
in productivity due to better technology in the long run.85
The media coverage continued to appear more frequently as the referendum vote
came closer. Articles such as one in Le Monde entitled “700 French Companies Created

150,000 jobs in Poland” appeared, and EU Commissioner for Regional Policy Danuta

Hubner made the controversial statement that relocations within the EU (i.e., toward
countries in Central and Eastern Europe) should be encouraged because it keeps them
from going to India or China.86 It is probable that these comments heightened French

fears that relocation would continue to exacerbate the unemployment situation in France;
also, because the EU approved of relocation according to Hubner, it would allow it to
continue. In an article from March in Le Monde, a poll showed that the main concern of

French enterprises was international competition and that business owners predicted more

relocations would take place in the future.87
Finally, in April, only one month before the vote on the referendum, articles

began appearing more frequently that discussed the problems of a liberal Europe and the

challenge of relocations to France. Le Monde in particular played an important role,
84 Le Monde, 10 March 2005. literally “happy relocations”
85 Ibid.
86 “700 Entreprises Franchises Ont Cree 150,000 Emplois En Pologne.” Le Monde, 2 March 2005 and Le
Monde, 2 March 2005.
87 Le Monde, 8 March 2005.
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because it published an article discussing the government’s access to information on
relocations. This article was controversial because it discussed two different reports that
the government had received. One prepared for the Minister of Social Cohesion came to

the conclusion that relocations were a serious threat to France, while the other only
investigated the positive aspects of companies that had resisted relocation and stayed in

France “against all odds.” However, the administration only released the positive report,

while the release of the negative report was delayed until after the referendum vote.88 It
seemed that the government was trying to downplay the negative aspects of relocation to
support the Yes campaign. In another article, the reports are discussed in relation to an

important televised interview with President Chirac. The interview that took place on 14
April 2005 with eighty-three young French people was intended to boost support for the

yes vote in a time when it seemed the No’s were gaining ground in the polls. In the
interview, President Chirac insists that relocation is not as bad as everyone fears, citing

only the government report which had drawn the positive conclusions and ignoring the
second report.89 Thus, the government had gone from finding solutions to relocation in

2004 to trying to downplay the relocations during the campaign on the Referendum.
In the months of April and May, during the key moment in the campaign for the
referendum, Le Monde published articles reporting official releases by the EU

commission claiming that industrial restructuring within the EU is inevitable.90 It is
plausible that it was the combined messages that the French public received on the issue
of relocation which contributed to the rejection of the Constitution. On one side, the

President told the public that relocation was not a serious problem for the EU vote, while
88 Le Monde, 20 April, 2005.
89 Ibid.
90 Le Monde 6 April 2005.
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the EU was releasing reports and statements insisting that relocation was inevitable and

had to be treated as an inescapable issue. Finally, just before the vote took place, an
article appeared on 26 May, reporting that certain workers of relocated companies had
been offered posts abroad for 100 euros per month.91 This was a necessary offer

according to the companies, because of existing legislation forcing them to offer transfers

as part of a collective layoff. This exacerbated the already tense situation caused by the
fear of relocations (See Figures 2 and 3).

91

Le Monde, 26 May 2005.
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Figure 2: “N’ayez Pas Peur!” (Don’t be Afraid!)

Source: Le Monde, 20 April 2005.
This cartoon appeared one month before the vote on the Constitution in France. It depicts
French industries delocalizing to the newly admitted Eastern European Countries of the
European Union. President Chirac repeated the phrase “N’ayez pas peur” (Don’t be
afraid) many times during an interview with 83 young people on the subject of the
Constitution. He tried to allay fears that French industries were moving east causing
unemployment in France.
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Figure 3: “Europe Challenged by Relocations”
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Source: Le Monde, 20 April 2005
This image portrays former Prime Minister Raffarin threatening to ‘relocate’ his
replacement, Prime Minister Villepin. After the Constitution failed to pass, Chirac named
Villepin as a replacement. Raffarin was unpopular with the French public and his
administration saw many protests against attempts to further privatize the certain sectors
of the French economy and to reform areas such as French pensions. Also, the fact that
relocation is the ‘threat’ is a joke about public concerns about French industry relocating.
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3.2 The Socialist Party Campaign
“One thing is for sure: after all this, we're all against this liberal
constitution, we're for a Europe of the people, not for a Europe of
salesmen " - Stephane Zervos is a 48 year old man who worked at a
factory for 22 years for the Swiss company Ronal. The factory
closed in the French town of Saint-Avold to relocate to Poland where
production costs are less. The closing put 167 people out of work in a
town of 17,000 residents and with an unemployment rate of 13 percent,
three points higher than the national rate.92

It is useful to discuss the role of the Socialist Party in the campaign because the

majority of No voters were from the Left, and the PS forms the largest percentage of No
voters within the Left. Many No voters voted against the PS official stand (in favor of

the Constitution) based on the same reasons given by the break away PS No campaign.
Also, a majority of the Left voters who were for Maastricht in 1992 helped reject the

Constitution in 2005.93 It is important to discuss the PS no campaign because one of its
main arguments against the Constitution was that the EU approved of relocations taking
place and because it was for a liberal free trade area. Of the PS voters polled, 29 percent

voted against the Constitution due to a fear of relocation of French Enterprises while 24
percent feared that the economic situation in France was too weak. 94

92 EU Business, 27 May 2005.
95 Ricard-Nihoul, "The French Non," 26.
94 See table 1.
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The Socialist Party in France did not have a unified stance on the Constitution

because a split developed within the Party over the Referendum. The party actually
circulated an internal vote in December of 2004 on the Referendum in order to determine

what the official party stance should be.95 This vote ended with the PS giving its official

support to the Yes campaign. However, subsequently some members of the PS broke

away and started a campaign for the No vote. PS-No campaign leaders reasoned that they
were against an EU of relocations, unemployment, and liberal trade policies that

weakened the economic situation in France.96
Two principal members of the PS, deputy leader Laurent Fabius and former first

secretary Henri Emmanuelli, campaigned for the No vote. Early into the campaign, on 9

September 2004, former Prime Minister (under the late president Mitterrand) Laurent
Fabius separated himself from his colleagues in the PS and declared on the prime time

television program France 2 “Question Ouverte” (Open Question) that he would only

support the Constitution if President Chirac fulfilled four demands. The following excerpt
from the interview represents the arguments against the EU.

Fabius : I ask that a new political agenda be created in Europe to
fight relocations... the French government said that it is necessary to
reduce the European budget, this is a mistake, if we want to fight
relocations, notably in Asia and India...it is necessary to develop
research, investment, technology, and that costs money...the question of
relocations within Europe, a day does not pass without a company leaving
France to move to Poland or Romania..
Interviewer: this began before enlargement and it is toward other
countries.. .China and India
Fabius: yes, of course there are also relocations toward China...but also
there are relocations within Europe, we see it in all the departments (of
France)

95 Ricard-Nihoul, "The French Non," 3.
96 Site of Appel des 200 French Campaign for the Non (accessed 6 January 2006) [online] available from:
http://www.appeldes2OO.net/article.php3?idarticle=328
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Interviewer: But is it not good that other countries like Poland benefit
(from investment)?
Fabius: No, it is not possible for us to finance with our money, the
lowering of taxes for these countries.. .that they take our companies, this
makes no sense, so it is necessary to have a “fiscal harmonization” so that
French companies do not continue to relocate in Europe on a massive
scale like they are doing...97
Fabius later became the leading PS member to lead the No-campaign, in which he argued
that relocations were damaging the French economy and threatening social protection in

France as well as causing more unemployment in general.

Henri Emmanuelli, a former first secretary of the PS was another leader of the No
campaign. He gave an interview with the French newspaper I’Humanite and the article
was entitled “Bolkestein, Delocalisations, Constitution: le meme idee,” (Bolkestein,

Relocations, Constitution: the same idea). This referred to the internal market for services

directive and related the ideas of the Bolkestein Directive, and relocations. Following the
comments made by Commissioner of Regional Policy Danuta Hubner on wanting to
facilitate relocations in Europe, Emmanuelli reasoned that these comments showed the
true purpose of the latest enlargement, implying that liberal policies and relocations were

the basis for the EU.98 PS No-campaign leaders feared the new EU would damage the

economic and social situation because current EU policy is in favor of facilitating
company relocations and free trade. Emmanuelli also launched his campaign for the No

vote during a demonstration against relocations. For his first official campaign
“appearance” he attended a demonstration in Vitry-le-Francois (Mame) where the
company Kadhan-Lamort had recently laid off 136 people in order to move the factory to

the Czech Republic. Emmanuelli asserted :
97 Laurent Fabius, Question Ouverte, 9 September 2005, France2. [online] available from: france2.fr
(accessed 5 January 2006).
98 I’Humanite, 1 7 February 2005.
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I have come here to let people know about your bad situation and
to warn the French about relocations/the “constitutionalization” of
relocations. If I took liberties with my party, it is because I continue to
believe in a Europe that does not follow the policy of social dumping, of
the Bolkestein Directive (on services), a Europe of the Liberal Right."
These comments reflect the same reasons given by many No voters; therefore, it is

plausible that the No campaign by the PS had an important influence over voters. Also, it
is possible to analyze the PS arguments against relocations and liberal trade policies to
understand why these reasons were cited as motivations for the No vote.

99 Le Monde, 8 March 2005.
("Je suis venu aider a faire connaître votre mauvais sort et alerter tous les Français des dangers des
délocalisations [and against] la constitutionalisation des delocalisations... si j’ai pris quelques libertés avec
mon parti, c’est parce que je continue a croire en un Europe qui ne suit pas celle du dumping social, celle
de la Directive Bolkestein (sur les services), une Europe de droit liberal.")
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3.3 Relocations: The Reality
Interview with President Chirac:
Young Lady: Then why do companies close? We see it, clothes are
cheaper because they are made elsewhere.
President Chirac: Take a company like Renault that makes cars in
Romania. Renault created this year 10,000 jobs of which 5,000 were in
France! Relocations are a problem that we must fight by other means,
which the government is trying hard to do, but it is not inevitable! Their
salaries and their expenses are lower but also their productivity!
Young male worker: Peugeot just moved to Poland. In my region, when
Peugeot is not doing well, nothing is doing well. If my company starts to
go to the East, we will not have any more work.
President Chirac: But I don’t think that Peugeot really wants to go
abroad—relocations are extremely positive for the creation of employment
in France—that is also the truth. 100

From the foregoing, it is clear that company relocation has become a controversial

issue in France as a representation of EU liberal policies and as a threat to French
employment. However, according to most reports, there are no exact figures or statistics

100 “Debat du President de la Réépublique avec desjeunes sur TF1: Referendum En Direct avec le
President,” Official Site of the office of the President/ La Présidence de la République, [online] available
from : www.elysee.fr 14 April 2005. (accessed 5 January 2006)
(“-Young lady in audience : Alors pourquoi les entreprises ferment ? On le voit bien, les habits sont moins
chers car ils sont fabriques ailleurs.
-President Chirac : Prenez une entreprise comme Renault, qui construit des voitures en Roumanie. Renault
a crée cette année 10.000 emplois dont 5000 en France ! Les delocalisations sont un problème contre lequel
il faut lutter par d’autres moyens, ce que le gouvemement s’efforce de faire, mais ce n’est pas ineluctable !
Leurs salaires et leurs charges sont plus bas, mais leur productivite aussi !
-Young male worker for Peugeot Sochaux : Peugeot vient de s’installer en Pologne. Dans ma region, quand
Peugeot va mal tout va mal. Si mon entreprise commence a partir a 1’Est... on n’aura plus de travail...
President : Mais je n’ai pas le sentiment que Peugeot veuille partir a 1’ètranger !... certaines delocalisations
sont extrêmement positif pour les creations d’emplois en France. Ca aussi, c’est la verite !”)
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available on actual relocations of French companies. Most studies show that relocation is

not as widespread as the French fear, and analysts argue that it only accounts for a

portion of the industrial restructuring that has been going on in France for decades
now.101 Sectors such as the leather, textile, and automobile industries have been affected
by this relocation. However, information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
shows that all sectors could be affected because of places with low-cost production

capability such as India, North African countries, Turkey, Central and Eastern European
countries and China (Asia in general).102 While the government admits that it cannot
stop the process of industrial restructuring of which relocation is a part, it has launched

programs to help mitigate its negative effects.

Relocation seems to be affecting many EU countries, and France is not an
exception. A study of 23 EU countries shows that sectors in many countries have been

affected. For example, the metal-working and services sectors in Belgium has an

estimated 10 percent of relocations to the new EU member states and awareness of

relocations seems to be high. The same applies to Germany, which has seen its

automotive sector relocate to the new EU member states as well as to Asia. Relocations
are a source of concern for unemployment.103 Nonetheless, the French seem to be
especially sensitive to the issue because of socio-economic concerns. This includes fears

that France’s social standards render it unable to compete with new member states. Also,

101 W. Rand Smith, The Left’s Dirty Job: The Politics of Industrial Restructuring in France and Spain. (PA:
University of Pittsburg Press, 1998), 6. and Jean-Pierre Dormois, The French Economy in the Twentieth
Century. (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 120.
102 Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ Ministere des Affaires Etrangères: “Economy-Structural
Features of the French Economy." [online] available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr (accessed 24
January 2006)
103 Robert Pedersini, “Relocation of Production and Industrial Relations” European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 2 June 2006. [online] available from
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2005/1 l/study/tnO511101s.html
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the fact that France has one of the highest rates of unemployment of all the OECD

countries is no doubt a source of concern about relocations.
The French government as well as the EU Commission have proposed and
implemented certain measures to counteract the negative effects of relocation. For

example, there have been proposed policies to deal with relocation including defining
priority sectors at the European level, increased research funding and innovation at the

EU level, and a type of new-colbertism which would plan at the EU level development by
sector.104 In 2005 France put more emphasis on helping high tech sectors rather than

supporting unskilled labor areas (such as textiles).105 This is the creation of areas that
would receive aid in order to focus on only one aspect industry or service
(“competitiveness poles”), but it remains to be seen if this policy will work.106 In the

meeting of the Council of Ministers of 12 February 2003, the EU created the MIMI
(Mission Interministérielle sur les Mutations Economiques) which monitors economic

changes. It is in place to anticipate a restructuring and to oversee aid given after

restructuring takes place. Also, the government created a program to aid certain regions
affected by restructuring.107

The EU and even reports of French origin explain that relocation is a necessary
and normal trend in the EU integration process. For example, relocations are perceived

to be beneficial because of international enrichment for all countries, and for France in
104 Catherine Mathieu and Henri Sterdyniak, “International Relocation and deindustrialization : some
French perspectives” in Competition from Emerging Countries, International Relocation and their Impacts
on Employment, 6. Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques, 5. [online] available from
http://www.euroframe.org.;
Jean Baptiste Colbert was a minister under French King Louis XIV known for bringing Mercantilism to
France and beginning the dirigiste tradition of the French state.
105 Ibid., 7 and 13 July 2005 International Herald Tribune [online] available from
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/07/13/business/web.franc.php
106 Fotagne and Lorenzi, 107.
107 Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 7. (called “contrat de site)
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the form of new markets.108 However, to what extent have the French actually seen this

occur? Relocation, according to the EU,
Occurs when a business or activity is totally or partially ceased, to
be reopened abroad by means of direct investment. In the European Union
we can distinguish between two types of relocation: a) internal: total or
partial transfer of business activity to another member state, orb) external:
total or partial transfer of business activity to non-EU countries. 109
Relocation falls within the EU’s goal to become more “competitive,” which is explained
as “the ability of the economy to provide its population with high and rising standards of

living and high rates of employment on a sustainable basis, the capacity of a society
continually to anticipate, adapt to and influence its economic environment.”110 The

author of a report meant to demonstrate the positive effects of the recent enlargement,

Francois Loos, the former French Minister of Foreign Trade from 2002-2005,
acknowledges the French fears of relocation, but tries to explain that it is not as
widespread as No voters fear. He comments that there is not a pattern of

deindustrialization but rather a restructuring which is a natural occurrence that simply
must be addressed with the proper economic and social legislation. Loos also remarks

that most of the relocation cases today threaten countries such as Mexico rather than
France, which already experienced this phenomenon in the 70s and 80s on a large scale.

However, Loos later concedes that relocation of French companies has taken place
toward the newly acceded countries. He notes that it took place in the past when French

FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) to new members of the EU went from 4.6 percent in

108 See section “De la Realité des Delocalisations.” Sénat: Rapport d’information n 374 Session ordinaire
de 2003-2004 by François Grignon, 2004. http://www.senat.fr/rap/r03-374/r03-3741.pdf
109 Official journal, Articlel.18.
110 Ibid., article 1.3
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overall effect of Eastern enlargement is very difficult to gauge, but some tentative
conclusions have been drawn from a Munich-based research group. Barysch, chief
economist for the Center for European Reform remarks that, “Since Western Europe has
traditionally run a trade surplus with central and Eastern Europe, the impact of trade
integration was almost certainly positive for the old EU.”115 Also, “the wages are much

lower in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland than in France,”
which is an attractive feature leading to the relocation of French companies. However,

since productivity levels of the average Western European worker are higher than in the

new EU countries, wage differentials are not necessarily a guarantee that companies will
relocate. 116 Generally studies have shown that enlargement will be an overall benefit for

Europe but that the immediate consequences are “immediate and concentrated on a
geographical and sectoral basis” such as relocation. 117
The scope and degree to which relocation has actually affected France is difficult
to measure. Nonetheless, analysts argue that it is taking place in France to a certain

extent. In a study led by The Bank of France in 2004, the authors found that the scope of
relocations is limited but has the capacity to grow much larger.

Most studies available

on the subject are inconclusive on the exact proportion of company relocations for

several reasons: the data used to measure relocations is not gathered expressly to measure

them. Instead, it is used to measure either foreign direct investment (FDI) or

import/export activity. FDI is not completely indicative of relocations because there are
generally (at least) two different kinds of FDI. These are either vertical/efficiency
115 Barysch, “East versus West.”
116 Ibid and Barysch, “How to Reap,” 2.
117 Ibid., 4.
118 “La Delocalisation, Bulletin de la banque de France,” 132 (December 2004), 27 [online] available from
www.banque.france.fr.
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investment or horizontal/market-seeking investment which is not considered to be
complete relocation. Also, it is possible to have a combination of these two different

kinds of FDI, thus rendering it almost impossible to gauge an exact measurement of the
occurrence of relocation.119

As for measuring relocation by import/export information, this is also not
completely reliable because a relocated company could be exporting the same goods as

the host country to which the relocated company moved, thus giving inaccurate
measurements on the exact amount of exports from a relocated company.120 Also,
deindustrialization is considered to be a main aspect of most developed societies; the

transition from a manufacture intensive society to a services based society is a natural
one.121 In 2000, a survey found that 50 percent of firms surveyed considered market

access as a first motivation for investment in the accession countries, while 30 percent of
that 50 percent of FDI was the horizontal type and only 20 percent was the vertical type

(associated with relocations). Most studies seem to conclude that relocation is not as

widespread as feared or as public debate implies. Also, studies show that increasing wage

levels are decreasing the attractiveness of the newly-acceded countries for vertical type
investment.122 This aspect would lead to the conclusion that even if there is a trend of

relocation to the new EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe, it would not
continue indefinitely due to increasing wage levels.

119 Ibid., 32.
120 Ibid., 16-17.
121 Grignon, "Deuxième Partie, Section A" (Second Part, Section A)
122 Frederique Sachwald, “The Impact of EU Enlargement on Finns’ Strategies and the Location of
production in Europe.” Tokyo Club Research Meeting, (November 2004), 38 [online] available from
www.iffi.org.
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The authors of another study concluded that certain sectors from 1978-2002
experienced a loss of jobs in France most likely connected to relocations: clothing and
leather production, fuel production, household equipment, and electronic equipment. The

same study reports, however, that information from the European Monitoring Center on

Change (industrial restructuring in Europe) attributes only 6.3 percent of employment
losses in France to international relocation.123 Thus, it is possible to conclude that while
the actual phenomenon of relocation is hard to measure, it has nonetheless taken place

and is a part of the process of deindustrialization that the French observed. This is
because France’s economy is overwhelmingly dominated today by the services sector.

Nonetheless, there are some estimates available for certain sectors affected by relocation.
Studies show that certain sectors are more likely to have been directly affected by
relocation such as the automobile, telecommunications and the textile industries. The

Western European car market is the world’s largest, and the location of new factories in
the new countries is taking place due to low cost production and potential for a future
market in these areas. However, the study by Frederique Sachwald on relocations

sponsored by the French Institute of International Relations shows that France is the only
exception to the trend of automobile factory relocations to the new countries because
French carmakers are not yet completely installed there. The general prediction is that

this will change as more French carmakers such as Peugeot and Renault open factories in

the East due to low cost production and potential for a future market in these areas.124 In
the telecommunications sector, France imports more than it exports, which could mean

that relocations have taken place. Sachwald notes that Eastern European countries have

123 Ibid., 16-17.
124 Sachwald, 19-21.
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become more specialized since the 1990s in the production of telecommunications

products from the Czech Republic and Hungary; but Japan and China are still much more

specialized. 12? Also, analysts argue that Eastern Europe will not long remain a location

for low wages as the newly acceded countries gradually develop to the former EU-15
wage levels, but it will, however, continue to move to areas like the Ukraine and

China.126 The textile and clothing industry is the industrial sector most affected by
relocation according to most measurements. This industry represents 7.4 percent of

industry in Europe and between 1993-2002, imports from the new EU member states

increased by 100 percent. However, the market share of East European countries was

only 25 percent, showing that the most imports of European countries come from China
which had close to 73 percent of the market share.127 According to this study, China

would be more responsible for relocations than the newly acceded Eastern European
countries. Thus, the textile and telecommunications sectors have been somewhat affected

by relocations and the automobile industry in France is likely to experience future cases
of relocations.

In another study, French Senator Grignon (1995-2006) concludes that relocation

is not as widespread as some French fear; rather it is only certain areas that are in danger.

He reports that it is mostly areas that are rural with a weak industrial presence that (when
they do experience a company closing) suffer the worst. He gives the example of the

company Limoux, which closed a site in 2000 in the Carcassonne region taking 500

industrial jobs away from an area which had less than 7,000 industrial jobs.128

125
126
127
128

Ibid., 32.
Barysh, East versus West, 10.
Sachwald 35- 36.
Grignon, “Deuxième Partie, Section B, 1 b”
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The French national statistics bureau also recently completed a study on relocations that
draws many of the same conclusions as the previous studies. The authors argue that over

the 1995-2001 time period, relocations only represented .35 percent of the reduction in

industrial employment annually which comes to about 13,500 employments relocated per
year. They conclude that while this is an estimate, it is probable that French fears are
exaggerated with regard to relocations. 129

Thus, it is possible to draw several conclusions from a review of recent studies on

relocations, even though different methods were utilized to estimate the actual amount of

relocations of French jobs. Most studies conclude that relocation has occurred to some
extent in the form of companies moving to either Eastern European countries or Asian
locations such as Japan or China; and that FDI in the form of both vertical, horizontal or a

hybrid combination of the two has occurred on a larger scale in these areas. They also

show that relocation is a part of a larger process of deindustrialization which most agree
is a natural process of developing countries that are transitioning to a more services based

economy. Lastly, it is clear that certain sectors have been more affected than others such
as the textile sector in France.

129 “Délocalisations et Reductions d’effectifs dans L’Industrie Française,” Dossier, INSEE, 2005, 70.
[online] available from
http://www.insee.fr/fr/indicateur/cnat_annu/base_2000/documentation/publications/ecofranc_2005_3.pdf
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Conclusion
Though the Treaty on the European Constitution was considered to be a historic
milestone in the long process of EU integration, its failure to pass in France and in other

countries in the EU has provoked questions concerning continued integration. The

Netherlands held a referendum on the Constitution on 1 June 2005; this was directly after
the French vote in May. These No’s have stalled acceptance of the Constitution in other

countries, namely in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. Some argue that EU integration will continue and that this is

only a short period of disillusionment caused by persistent unemployment, especially in

France. The French rejected the Constitution mainly for economic and social reasons, and

it is unclear how these concerns will be addressed by policy makers in the future.
It is clear that liberal policies at both the EU and national French level play a large

role in how the French form their ideas on European Integration; especially because these
policies are perceived to exacerbate the unemployment situation. Certain aspects of the
EU heightened French fears of unemployment such as relocations and the addition of

new countries to the Union in 2004. This became a basis of the PS argument against the
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Referendum. The leaders of the PS no campaign asserted that relocations and unfair

competition with an enlarged EU were among the main justifications for rejecting the
Constitution. This is mainly because the Constitution came to represent the idea of an EU

that was too focused on liberal trade and not enough on social protection. This can be
observed in media coverage reporting relocations in France or by interviews with the

President where young French workers expressed their concerns about liberal
competition, relocations and job loss. Even though the process of enlargement had

already taken place, the French still feared liberal EU policies would create unfair
competition leading to job losses.
The actual phenomenon of relocation does not appear to be as widespread as

French fears would imply, but studies suggest that there are some areas of France that are
affected by relocation mainly because they are dependent on one of the sectors that is

affected by globalization, such as textiles. Thus, when one company relocates to another

area, the effects seem to be extremely harsh mainly because the area is underdeveloped

and largely dependent on that one sector. Also, studies suggest that a natural transition to
an economy based more on services is normal and has been going on in France for years.

The combination of public debate on relocation combined with the campaign against the

Constitution heightened fears of liberal competition that would damage the French
economy and create more unemployment.

The Socialist Party campaign for the No vote expressed the same logic that liberal
EU policies were causing relocations and unfair liberal competition. This logic reflects
the motivations many No voters gave for rejecting the EU Constitution. This can be

observed in the PS campaign initiated by L. Fabius, who asserted that relocations were
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taking place throughout France and EU liberal policies were threatening French jobs.

Another prominent PS No campaign leader, H. Emanuelli, argued that they had lost the
battle for a social Europe, a Europe that is not based on liberal free market principles, and

one which has legislation in place to protect against harsh or unfair competition.
It is interesting to note that the vote on the Constitution came to symbolize a vote

of approval of the EU in general. The vote came to represent not only an opinion on the
actual text of the Constitution, but also a vote on an enlarged Europe and on the type of

Europe that should exist. On one side there are those who believe Europe should not be a

place where relocations and liberal free market trade takes place. The other believes that
more competition will lead to better benefits for all Europeans. However, liberalization is
a process that has been taking place in the EU and in France for decades; it is not a new
trend. Former Commission President Jacques Delors emphasized the importance of the

market when he initiated the Single European Act, and liberalization has been taking

place in France since the economic U-turn of 1983 under late former President

Mitterrand. Nonetheless, the 2005 No vote results from the recent emphasis on liberal

trade in the form of the Lisbon Strategy, as well as a fear of international competition
within the newly-enlarged Union. Also, the continued stance of French politicians against

liberal trade and the current French government’s inability to resolve the problem of
unemployment contributed to French discontent. The government must find a way to

solve its current economic problems that have become a main concern of the French
public.
The No vote is significant in a broader context because it raises questions about

the social and economic status quo of France and Europe. In order for further European
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integration to continue, there must be an agreement between all the member states on the

type of Union that should exist. A consensus must be reached on what type of market and

social model should exist in the Union. This is especially important for the French and
British, who have been at odds over these issues since Britain joined the Union. Lastly,
the French must accept that their participation in the Union adds pressures of competition
in a globalized world. France faces competition from countries within the Union as well
as countries that are not part of the internal market. Policy makers have made

considerable progress in making the French economy more competitive, but many
politicians have continued to speak out against competition and globalization while

pursuing liberal policies simultaneously. These contradictions must be resolved in order
to guarantee the future economic and social success of France.
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